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ABSTRACT 
The centerpiece of the new U.S. strategy for the "New World Order" is 
strategic reserve called the Crisis Response Force, designed to replace 
lany aspects of our current forward defense. This study examines whether 
strong, standing strategic reserve is appropriate to the American situation 
l the coming decade; it proceeds by comparing the overall strategy with 
ve historic case studies of systems that faced similar problems and oppor­
lnities. The historic models chosen are the Roman Empire (from the fall 
f Carthage to A.D. 69; from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306; and from A.D. 306 until the 
nal collapse); the Byzantine Empire; and the British Empire from Waterloo 
• World War I. The study applies a set of seven criteria to each case and 
(stematically examines the results to fmd pitfalls and mechanisms which 
lay have enduring relevance to a postulated future predicted by the 1991 
'aval War College Global War Game. The study concludes that, as a 
Klssibly extended) transitional stage toward an ideal network of regional 
)alitions, the new national strategy is realistic and effective-except, 
gnificantly. in the Middle East where a "naval bridge" approach should 
� taken. This study was originally prepared as a report for the Strategy and 
ampaign Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War 
ollege (Strategy and Campaign Report 12-91). 
Toward a Pax Universalis 
A Historical Critique of the National 
Military Strategy for the 1990s 
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RESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, defense secretary Richard Cheney, and 
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have 
advocated a new U.S. strategy in the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact and the recently completed "devolution" of the Soviet Union.! The 
president articulated the grand strategic design in his Aspen speech of 2 
August 1990.2 General Powell explained the proposed military framework 
for this grand strategic design in his "chairman's vision" speech on 5 
December 1990.3 
The thrust of the overall concept is that the United States simply will not 
be able to afford a strategy of strong forward defense everywhere, given the 
thirty-percent budget reduction anticipated in the wake of the communist 
strategic collapse.4 The wisdom of such an approach is obvious to observers 
of the military budget debate. The threats we currently face are hard to 
define; we know they lurk there-and we see the chaos in Africa, Lebanon, 
and now in Eastern Europe, posed by problems of governance, ethnic 
hatreds, and religious fundamentalism. However, from a strategic force 
planning perspective, these threats are difficult to translate to a Congress 
and a public hungry for the expected peace dividend. Who, in February of 
1990, would have predicted that we would be at war with Iraq one year later? 
The centerpiece of the Chairman's strategic vision is a strong, mobile, 
strategic reserve designed to replace many aspects of our current forward 
defense with the cheaper and more economical alternative of rapid deploy­
ment to a threatened area. Other aspects of the strategy include force 
packages dedicated to the Atlantic and Pacific, independent of the Contin­
gency Force, for forward presence; reduced forward presence and U.S. 
basing overseas; and increased use of U.S. strategic mobility to compensate 
for reduced forward presence.s 
The heavy reliance on a strong strategic reserve, the nucleus of this 
strategy, is a point of controversy. Historian Arther Ferrill contends that the 
development of a strong, mobile reserve was a primary cause of the fall of 
the Roman Empire in the West. 6 Military commentators such as Harry 
Summers have voiced concern that the reserve contemplated in the new U.S. 
strategy may be too lightly armed to win. Captain Allen L. Tiffany of the 
U.S. Army Reserve writes: "Though the importance of having rapidly 
deployable forces cannot be overstated, rapid deployability must take a back 
seat to the intelligent and reasonable design of combat units ... 7 Dr. Mackubin 
Owens echoes that concern and urges an intelligent, sequenced introduction 
of forces into theaters in contingency situations.8 However, this study is not 
designed to comment on the adequacy of the reserve; it is rather to examine 
whether a strong standing strategic reserve is appropriate to our situation in 
the approaching decade. 
To say that the United States should not adopt the system proposed in the 
Chairman's vision because a strong strategic reserve failed the Roman 
Empire would be an unfounded generalization; it would also, however, be 
a mistake to ignore historical experience in examining the merits of the new 
strategy. This study attempts to place the new strategy in a historical context 
by comparing it with five historic case studies of similar problems and 
opportunities. Four of the cases examined are generally considered suc­
ceses, and one a failure. All had some degree of success for a considerable 
amount of time. The criteria used in selecting these five particular historical 
security systems were: 
• Each system had no large "superpower" competitor, but faced a 
number of smaller scale and less coherent threats than would be the case in 
bipolar competition. 
• Each system was relatively durable; it had lasted for at least a 
century. 
• Each encompassed a large multinational security system. (A can­
didate on the scale of Swiss or Swedish models would not have been large 
enough to satisfy the criteria.) 
The objective was to study models of complexity and relative diffuseness 
of threat approximating the challenges and opportunities that will be faced 
by the United States in the post-Cold War era. The models that were chosen 
are: The early Roman Empire (from the destruction of Carthage to A.D. 69), 
the middle Roman Empire (from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306), the late Roman Empire 
(from A.D. 306 to the collapse in A.D. 476), the Byzantine Empire (A.D. 527 
to A.D. 10(0), and the British Empire from Waterloo to World War I. 
Each case study examines several categories relevant to the situation the 
United States will face in the coming decades. These are: the method of 
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forward engagement, the type of reserve, the relative closure capability of 
reserve, the degree to which the system being defended depended on the 
periphery of the system for economic well-being, the cost of the security 
system, the balance between the forward-engagement and reserve com­
ponents, indications and warning, and deterrence. 
The study then draws systemic comparisons and offers some conclusions 
based on those comparisons. The objective in so doing is not to attempt to 
model our own security system on historical experiences that may well have 
been made irrelevant now by changed circumstances; rather, it is to fmd 
potential pitfalls and successful mechanisms which may have such enduring 
relevance that they will be useful in a critical and constructive examination 
of our own strategic instruments. The key question in the systemic analysis 
is whether an effective balance-between forward engagement and the 
proposed standing strategic reserve component (represented by the Contin­
gency Force)-can be built into the proposed new strategy. All seven factors 
listed above will influence this attempted balance, but not equally. The 
historic models will give some indication of the weight each factor once had 
in circumstances similar to those that will be encountered by U.S. strategists 
in developing the new strategy. 
To make such assessments, it has been necessary to postulate the future 
environment in which the new strategy will act. The predictive vehicle 
chosen is the Global War Game played at the Naval War College in July 
1991. This game attempted to look ahead to the "new world order" in the 
next decade. 
The study as a whole attempts to answer these key questions: 
• Will the new strategy accomplish its objectives, that of giving the 
U.S. allies adequate security at an affordable cost with the reduced base 
force as postulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? 
• Is the system of forward engagement envisioned in the new 
strategy adequate? If not, what can be done to adjust it? 
• Is the strategic reserve postulated in the new strategy adequate? If 
not, what adjustments can be made? 
This study may appear to some to be ethnocentric and perhaps neo-im­
perialistic. It is not intended to be so. In a speech to the United Nations on 
23 September 1991, President Bush stated plainly that the United States 
does not desire to impose a "Pax Americana" as a new world order. He 
stated, rather, that he was looking for a "Pax Universalis" whereby this 
country will be a partner in seeking a better world.9 
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There is a two-fold difficulty inherent in this study. First, for better or for 
worse, the United States is the world's only remaining superpower. There 
is no way to approach the subject without dealing with that reality. Dr. 
Robert Wood of the Naval War College likens this new senior-partner status 
to that of a "Global Marshal" rather than to the older and unpopular analogy 
of the "Global Policeman." He points out that the primary job of the U.S. 
Marshal in the American West was to put together ad hoc coalitions or 
posses to deal with emerging threats.lo General Powell envisions what 
appears to be the U.S. military's effort to position our forces so as best to 
contribute in the future to such efforts, in light of the lessons of the past few 
years. 
A second problem that must be faced in taking a historical perspective 
is that the security systems that have faced circumstances similar to those 
we see today all chose to call themselves "empires." In view of the criteria 
chosen, it would be hard to find historical examples that were not imperial. 
The unfortunate truth is that despite the purest of motives we cannot change 
the circumstances that we inherit. H we can profit from the experiences of 
the Romans and Byzantines, we should do so. In studying them, we may 
well learn to avoid their failures. 
The Early Roman Hegemonic Model 
In his provocative study, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 
Edward Luttwak describes the early Roman imperial security system as a 
hegemonic empire. II With the destruction of Carthage, Rome became the 
sole "superpower" in the Western world, as it was known during that era. 
She was consequently thrust into the role of guarantor of security. From the 
fall of Carthage onward, Rome developed with nations and tribes on the 
Mediterranean periphery a patchwork system of client relationships that 
placed considerable strategic depth between potential enemies and key 
interests. The clients who provided this depth were allowed considerable 
latitude within this system to act independently as long as their efforts did 
not conflict with vital Roman interests.12 This allowed the Romans to 
exercise crisis management rather than having to garrison the entire 
periphery of the areas they viewed as vital. The system lasted roughly from 
146 B.C. to A.D. 67 and provided an acceptable and affordable degree of 
security. 
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Method of Forward Engagement. The Roman strategy of forward engage­
ment during this period was, insofar as possible, to allow the clients to 
handle on their own any low to mid-level threats to economic and social 
stability. If a threat became too great for the cllent to deal wi� the legions 
intervened. 13 Rome maintained garrisons on Roman soil close to the client's 
frontier, and sometimes in the territory of the client, depending on the 
coherence and immediacy of the threat. 14 Notwithstanding, the preferred 
method of dealing with any incursion on the imperial periphery was to allow 
the client to make original contact and then to assess the situation. This 
afforded the luxury of considerable economy of force. This ring of sur­
rogates was never fully closed, particularly along the Gennan border where 
competent clients were hard to find. IS Nonetheless, the system did allow the 
Romans to economize elsewhere. 
Type of Reserve. The hegemonic system had no actual standing strategic 
reserve, although as Luttwak points out, localized reserves were available.I6 
Rome depended on the strategic depth afforded by the clients, backed up by 
neighboring legions in the region, to provide warning adequate to 
redistribute forces to a trouble spot or to raise new legions if warranted. 
Luttwak and the noted historian T. Mommsen think the absence of a reserve 
constituted an unacceptable risk, but other commentators such as Arther 
Ferrill feel that the risk was justified by the absence of an enemy capable of 
launching an attack from two strategic directions at once. 17 
Relative Closure Time of Reserve. Because there was no centralized 
standing strategic reserve, an ad hoc reserve had to be constituted if a threat 
arose beyond the joint capabilities of clients and local Roman forces. This 
was generally done by fashioning a reaction force from neighboring regions 
or, in rare cases, by raising entirely new legions.I8 The process was cum­
bersome, but it did not have to be exercised very often. Commentators who 
normally disagree on the quality of Roman strategy, such as Edward 
Luttwak and Theodore Mommsen, consider this to have been an unaccep­
table strategic risk, but others such as Ferrill argue that tacking a superpower 
threat capable of coordinated attacks from several strategic directions, the 
Romans could well afford to take this risk. Ferrill further argues that while 
a reserve is an imperative at the tactical and operational levels of war, it is 
not always appropriate at the strategic level.19 The best evidence for this 
position is that the Romans during this period got along without one. The 
hegemonic system never faced a threat so ominous as to cause the Romans 
of that era to consider seriously creating a strategic reserve. When the 
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Flavian emperors shifted to a preclusive system (strong forward defense) 
after A.D. 70, they also did without a reserve. 
Economic Dependence on the Periphery. A primary reason why this 
system served Rome so well during this period was that no truly vital region 
or key interest of the empire was directly exposed to immediate risk in case 
of invasion. This gave the system strategic depth. Egypt, with its vital grain 
supply, was the most remote overseas possession truly vital to the economic 
well-being of the empire; even it. however, was safely protected by clients 
on the west and east as well as by the strategic depth afforded by the desert 
to the south. 
Cost of the Security System. In terms of manpower and national treasure, 
the hegemonic system was perhaps the most inexpensive of those surveyed 
in this study.20 Of course, this was made possible by the fact that the client 
states were then bearing much of the cost, which would be borne by the 
Roman taxpayer in the middle and late Roman systems.21 The entire empire 
was guarded by an army that seldom exceeded 380,000 troops, only about 
half of whom were fully paid regulars and the rest auxiliaries.22 Although 
there is no record of anyone having actually done so, there were individual 
Romans in that period who could have paid from their personal fortunes the 
entire cost of the Roman contribution to the security system.23 This is a 
circumstance seldom equalled in the history of great empires. 
Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. Obviously there was 
no such balance because there was no formal standing reserve. Ferrill's view 
that reserves have little efficacy at the strategic level when the threat is not 
strategically coherent appears to be the main principle at work here. 
Indications and Warning. The Romans of this period appear to have 
constructed an excellent intelligence system composed of spies, diplomats, 
and paid informers such as Josephus the turncoat Jewish general. This type 
of intelligence was particularly important in client management. To be sure, 
the intelligence system was not rapid; on occasion the Romans suffered 
strategic surprise, as during the Jewish Revolt. It appears their use of 
Josephus at the time was an attempt to "get inside the heads" of their rebel 
opponents.24 The system appears generally to have worked well enough to 
give the Romans relatively good warning. 
Deterrence. The operation of "armed suasion," the knowledge of what 
Rome was capable of doing if displeased, is described by Luttwak in The 
Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. This concept appears to have been 
used by the Romans as a tool with which to apply a measured threat of 
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military power in the diplomatic arena for the purposes of managing clients 
and deterring potential foes.2S 
The Middle Roman Empire and Preclusive Security 
The father of the era of "preclusive security" (as Luttwak calls it) in the 
Roman Empire was the Emperor Vespasian, who began after A.D. 67 the 
process of absorbing the majority of the client states directly into the empire, 
thereby increasing immensely central control of the security system.26 There 
is a great deal of debate among historians as to why the Romans abandoned 
the messy but successful hegemonic system. Luttwak feels that the soldier­
emperors may have simply become impatient with the "leisurely" 
diplomatic processes required to manage the c1ients?7 It is also likely that 
Vespasian and his allies in the Senate realized that with the "middleman," 
in the form of client governments, eliminated, Rome's coffers would be 
increased greatly. It is probably safe to assume that no "cost-benefit 
analysis" of any sort was done to ensure that the long-term costs of larger 
armies, fortifications, and direct imperial administration would not even­
tually outweigh the increased revenue; we will probably never know if one 
was. The reason the Romans abandoned the hegemonic system is probably 
irrelevant to this discussion, but it is significant that the hegemonic empire 
required less outlay of men and money than the preclusive system that will 
now be examined. 
By the reign ofTrajan (about A.D. 101), the empire had stopped expanding 
and had embarked on a deliberate policy of strategic defense, a strategy of 
perimeter protection thoroughly characterized by forward engagement with 
no standing strategic reserve. Like its predecessor, this strategy has been 
criticized by some for lacking a reserve and by others for fostering a 
"Maginot mentality.,,28 However, it must be noted that the system served 
Rome well for over two hundred years and was never seriously breached in 
a manner threatening the overall security of the empire. 
Method of Forward Engagement. This era was probably the golden age of 
forward engagement. The Romans tenaciously defended every foot of the 
imperial periphery with a series of limes (field fortifications) that included 
watchtowers, blockhouses, great legionary bases, and extensive patrol­
ling.29 Remains of these great fortifications, such as Hadrians's Wall, can 
still be seen today. The legions that manned them came to stay, and they 
became regionalized. Some modem critics feel these legions became too 
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regionally oriented.30 However, the legions did have a great impact in 
making the border regions of the empire more Roman in culture and 
economics, which made them easier to govern and more profitable to tax, 
and also rendered them more fertile ground for army recruiting. 31 
Type of Strategic Reserve. Like the hegemonic model, this system had no 
standing strategic reserve but depended on forward engagement and the 
superb combat efficiency of the Roman legions to prevail against even 
numerically superior enemies.32 Although strategically defensive, this sys­
tem depended on offensive action to win its battles. Romans of this period 
fought from within field fortifications only until they were able to launch a 
decisive counterattack. 33 
Relative Closure Capability of Reserve. Lacking a standing reserve, and 
because any reserve would have to be formed before being dispatched, this 
system had a very poor closure capability. However, like the hegemonic 
system, it did not face a coordinated strategic threat that would have 
necessitated such a reserve.34 On those rare occasions when a local debacle 
such as the Parthian War required considerable reinforcement, neighboring 
regions contributed legions to the trouble spot. 3S 
Economic Dependence on Periphery. This is a doubtful area. It is certain 
that the periphery became more important to the empire as the outer 
provinces became more Romanized, but this process was an evolutionary 
one. The emperor Aurelian certainly felt comfortable about giving up Dacia 
(Romania) voluntarily in A.D. 155 as an economy of force measure, but later 
emperors fought fiercely to retain the tax base and recruiting pool that the 
provinces had come to represent.36 We are forced to conclude that the 
resources devoted to the fixed defenses by a succession of emperors were 
not spent lightly, and further that the money was invested to protect 
something deemed very valuable indeed. 
Cost of the Security System. The system of preclusive security was more 
expensive in men and money than the hegemonic system (though less so 
than the strong reserve system that followed it). Added to the cost of 
maintaining a 380,OOO-man legionary force was the cost of building and 
maintaining the limes, roadbuilding, and creating provincial bureaucracies 
to replace the deposed client governments.37 There does not appear to have 
been an accurate method of determining whether the costs outweighed 
benefits. It would appear, considering the system's relative longevity, that 
those in power thought that it was cost-effective. 
Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. As with the early 
hegemonic system, there is no issue relative balance because there was no 
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standing reserve. This should not imply a value judgment, but it does support 
two ideas: that unbalanced systems with sufficient strategic depth, strong 
forward engagement, or a combination of both, can operate successfully; 
and, that a strong mobile reserve is not necessarily required in a security 
system lacking an opponent capable of launching coordinated attacks from 
more than one strategic direction. No inference can be drawn that a strong 
mobile reserve will not work; we can only conclude that a balanced system 
is not a prerequisite in all situations. 
Indications and Warning. It would appear that the strong intelligence 
process of the hegemonic system was not significantly diminished during 
this era, but Rome appears to have depended for warning on tactical means 
such as watchtowers, blockhouses, and patrols, augmented by rapid reaction 
systems rather than on more strategic-level human intelligence.38 Systems 
which rely on strong forward defense can accept such shallow warning 
arrangements if there is relatively little danger of strategic attack from 
several directions.39 Thus Luttwak' s criticism of the system is probably not 
relevant. Fortunately for Rome, she did not face a Genghis Khan or a 
Napoleon. 
Deterrence. Roman deterrence remained strong in this era.4O It was certainly 
highly visible, and the Romans had developed an unmistakable record of 
military successes from which they could draw to demonstrate it. Even the 
most unsophisticated barbarian prowling the periphery of the empire could 
see concrete proof of Roman engineering and military excellence in the 
limes, Hadrian's Wall, and other visible manifestations of Roman power 
and competence. Those who tested the system were dealt with harshly. 
The Late Roman System and a Standing Strategic Reserve 
Beginning in the third century A.D., a fundamental change occurred in the 
Roman Empire. The reason for the relative decline of the Roman security 
system during this period, leading ultimately to the collapse of the Roman 
Empire, has been a major cause of debate among historians who have 
specialized in examining the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire; 
Edward Gibbon, Theodore Mommsen, Hans Delbruck, and Arther Ferri ll 
disagree to some extent on this point. Declining population, increasing 
barbarian pressure, and a decline in the state of public morals have all 
received some measure of blame for the collapse of the empire in the West. 
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A definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study and 
may well remain a pennanent subject of controversy. 
One fact, however, remains clear: beginning with the reigns of Diocletian 
and Constantine the Great, the empire developed a strong, mobile strategic 
reserve as the primary means of ensuring security. The system evolved 
gradually, first attempting a balanced combination of forward engagement 
and reserve, then producing a system that relied primarily on the strategic 
reserve.41 The reasons given for the decline of forward engagement structure 
are varied, but the decline itself is irrefutably documented.42 
Ferrill argues strongly that the root cause of this change was not a more 
dangerous external threat but an attempt by the autocratic emperors of the 
period to protect the central seat of power. As the reserve became increas­
ingly stronger and more elite, the perimeter security force became more like 
a local militia.43 It also became increasingly barbarian." Luttwak claims 
that to some extent barbarians were invited, in a hollow imitation of the 
hegemonic client system.4S Delbruck is inclined to think they forced their 
way in.46 Whatever the cause, forward engagement declined slowly but 
inexorably. 
This decline resulted in a situation where barbarian incursions meant the 
immediate loss of territory on the imperial periphery until a counterattack 
could be mounted.47 Increasingly, however, the quality of the reserve itself 
also declined; this decline was not as precipitous as that of the border troops, 
but it meant that imperial forces began to fail in their counterattacks. Thus, 
large chunks of the empire were lost forever.48 Worse, these peripheral 
regions had become the primary recruiting territory for the legions; the 
effects of their losses were not only cumulative but exponential. 49 This 
meant that the decline began to pick up momentum, because each Roman 
loss was a disproportionate enhancement to the various barbarian entities 
encroaching on the empire . .50 Despite heroic efforts on the part of several 
talented and energetic individuals, the empire was dead by A.D. 476. 
Method of Forward Engagement. We can be sure that Constantine the 
Great and his immediate successors did not deliberately set out to create a 
system that would destroy the empire; the change to a mobile reserve 
(actually begun by Diocletian) was a reaction to the strife that had preceded 
his ascension to the purple. After fighting a great civil war to preserve 
control of the empire, Constantine created a standing reserve specifically to 
ensure his hold on power, not to undennine the system of forward engage­
ment.Sl The subsequent decline of forward engagement was a classic 
example of the law of unintended consequences. The decline was evolution-
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ary, and in the East it was ultimately arrested. Ferrill strongly argues that 
the barbarization of the army exacerbated this decline both on the periphery 
and eventually in the reserve itself as well:S2 Eventually, the border anny 
became a mere collection of ragtag militias and barbarian federate mer­
cenaries (the term federate, or foederati, denotes barbarian mercenaries 
fighting for Rome but under the control of their own officers) of doubtful 
quality and of increasingly doubtful loyalty.53 
Type of Reserve. Although Diocletian was rust to use a strong strategic 
reserve, it was Constantine who began the process of institutionalizing it. 54 
The reserve began as a cavalry-dominated entity that nonetheless relied to 
some extent on disciplined infantry formations. 55 As the years wore on, this 
reserve became even more cavalry-oriented and increasingly Germanic.56 
As tactics began to revert to a more Gothic model (of relatively undis­
ciplined heavy cavalry), the Romans lost much of the traditional tactical 
advantage they had enjoyed against the more numerous barbarian hosts. 
This meant that likelihood of Roman tactical success was reduced by the 
fifth century; where it had once been nearly certain, it was now problemati­
ca1.57 As it evolved, the Roman security system needed a reserve that could 
quickly move to a threatened area and defeat an incursion-or failing that, 
at least conduct a successful counterattack to recover lost ground.58 In 
actuality, the system in its later years proved incapable of doing either with 
any consistency.59 
Relative Closure Capability 0/ Reserve. This aspect of Roman security had 
not changed appreciably from the time of the early empire. It still took 
approximately two months to march from Rome to Cologne.60 Even the 
switch to cavalry-heavy formations did not appreciably speed strategic 
mobility, because the army could move no faster than its trains. Transport 
by sea was generally faster than by land (to areas on the periphery that were 
accessible by sea), but it remained very risky due to the vagaries of 
Mediterranean weather. 61 This is an important point because the system 
depended on rapid closure to make up for its growing lack of a strong 
forward component and its increasingly inadequate strategic depth. Rome 
had become dependent on a rapid-deployment strategy that simply could 
not do the job. 
There is an irony here. Luttwak points out that the Romans lacked the 
modem means of rapid deployment available to us today and speculates that 
they might have done things differently if given that advantage. However, 
as noted, the Romans usually required at least sixty days to march their 
strategic reserve to the closest point on the periphery-Cologne; the players 
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in the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game (about which more later) 
found that (setting aside Maritime Prepositioned Force assets) it would take 
a U.S.-based strategic reserve about that same sixty days to get to the Middle 
East with enough sustainment to be credible. Today, it still takes about sixty 
days to get the real combat power of the contingency force to a theater except 
for the Maritime Prepositioning Force. It seems that one pays a price for 
technological improvements in combat power: one's forces become heavier 
and less mobile. 
It is important not to draw hasty conclusions here. If this Roman system 
had possessed adequate strategic depth, or an adequate means for warning, 
it probably would have been much more effective in the long run. Thus we 
cannot infer from this case that standing strategic reserves without a strong 
mechanism for forward engagement are inherently bad; we can only observe 
that they were bad in this particular situation. We can also observe that any 
system that depends strongly on a standing strategic reserve allows the 
quality and combat capability of that reserve to decline only at great peril 
to its security. 
Economic Dependence on the Periphery. By A.D. 200, Rome had come to 
depend on the outer provinces as a primary source of resources and 
economic strength.62 As is the case with our own economy today, many vital 
resources were located in exposed positions on the periphery of the security 
system. This dependence meant that Rome had strategic depth only in the 
sense that the imperial center was protected from peripheral threats; each 
loss on the periphery made the system weaker. However, the primary 
concern of the autocratic and centralized imperial center was the preserva­
tion of the power base of the emperor; protecting the periphery was of 
secondary concern. As a result, ironically, the system ate the talented pig of 
the fable, "one leg at a time ... 63 
Cost of the Security System. One of the pitfalls of trying to compare the 
strategic reserve of the late Roman Empire to the presently proposed 
American system is that whereas the Chairman envisions a system that 
would be cost-effective, the late Roman reserve was designed more to 
protect the emperor from internal devils than from the barbarians at the 
proverbial gate.64 Cost, therefore, was not a major consideration for the later 
Roman Empire. This is exemplified in the words of the Emperor Septimus 
Severus to his sons, "Be united, enrich the soldiers, scorn the rest...65 Preston 
and Wise show that this was done with a vengeance. In addition, as they 
point out, a caste system was created to ensure the availability of revenue­
producing skills and military manpower for a security system that grew 
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increasingly more expensive in its later years.66 This meant that successive 
generations were locked involuntarily into hereditary occupations. This act 
of economic desperation not only failed to cure the empire's economic woes 
in the long run, but also helped set the scene for the curse of feudal serfdom. 
Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. The decline of the 
Roman system of forward engagement in comparison with the strategic 
reserve is one the few points on which the majority of historians agree. 
Because the decline of the forward engagement system is important in 
comparing the proposed U.S. system with the late Roman model, we will 
use the words of the historians themselves to describe the state of balance. 
Delbruck comments, "Now, however, the emperors could not get along 
without relatively large bodies of troops readily available even if in so doing 
they weakened the borders and sacrificed them to the incursions of the 
barbarians ... 67 Ferrill writes, "Over the course of a century after 
Constantine's change in Roman grand strategy, the frontier troops turned 
into a ragtag local militia, while the reserve troops did all the fighting . .,68 
Luttwak also admits to the late Roman system's lack of balance: .. It is 
apparent that reductions made in the provincial forces that guarded the 
frontiers in order to strengthen the regular field armies would always serve 
to provide security for imperial power, but they must have degraded the 
day-to-day security of the common people . .. 69 
Indications and Warning. As the system of forward engagement declined, 
so did that for intelligence. As an example, at Adrianople in A.D. 378, Valens 
thought he was facing only 10,000 Visigoths; the enemy force actually 
numbered many more than that. Worse still, the Romans had no idea of the 
actual disposition of the enemy. This was a far cry from the days of Scipio 
Africanus. Marius, and Caesar, when the proper preparation of terrain for 
an entire campaign was considered a high art form.7o With the exception of 
an occasional talented individual such as Aetius, who used his personal 
knowledge --of the Huns (gained as a hostage) to splendid advantage at 
Chalons, Roman strategic and tactical intelligence appears to have declined 
alanningly.71 Lacking effective strategic depth, the Roman system needed 
very timely warning. What it got was not effective enough in the late years 
of the empire. 
Deterrence. Roman deterrence had formerly been a function of reputation 
and visible presence. By the fifth century, both had declined disastrously, 
until the humiliating situation in A.D. 452 when all that stood between Rome 
and the Huns was the Pope. Roman legions were now a parody of their 
former selves and were legions in name only. 72 They were not to be seen on 
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the periphery; worse still, when they did amve there, they often lost to their 
adversaries. This decline was slow at first, but as Ferrill documents, a 
"snowball effect" occurred as the concept of suasion effectively evaporated 
in the last decades of the empire. 
The Byzantine System: A Balanced Model 
The Byzantine system eventually became what the late Roman system 
was originally designed to be: a balanced arrangement that had as its core 
a strong strategic reserve complemented by strong and supple means of 
forward engagement. Both the late Roman system in the West and the 
Byzantine system were fathered by Constantine, but where the system of 
forward engagement broke down in the Western empire, it flourished in the 
East. 
Due largely to the reforms of the Emperor Maurice, the Eastern or 
Byzantine empire developed a concept of forward engagement based on the 
hardy peasant militia of her provinces combined with a superb cadre of 
professional soldiers and field fortifications. The mobile strategic reserve, 
a heavy cavalry fonnation, moved quickly to reinforce when necessary; as 
often as not, however, the forward-based forces alone could handle low to 
mid-level incursions. The mobile reserve was certainly effective, but it was 
first and foremost a means of ensuring the survival of the centralized 
autocratic dynasty in Constantinople.73 
The Byzantine system proved to be one of the most resilient in history, 
lasting essentially intact for five hundred years. Even after the economic 
and social collapse after A.D. 1000, some semblance of empire lasted until 
the fifteenth century. This knack for survival merits the Byzantine system 
special attention. 
Method of Forward Engagement. Like the contemporary late Roman 
Empire, the Byzantine Empire lacked strategic depth; unlike its sister 
system, the Byzantine model developed, after the reign of the emperor 
Justinian, a healthy system for forward engagement and forward defense. 
"Ultimately, by granting tax relief to serving soldiers and plots of land on 
discharge, the state succeeded in recruiting the entire anny rank and file 
from the dependable inhabitants within its borders ... 74 A strong peasant 
militia augmented the regular units within each theme (military district), 
resulting in a military system defended largely by natives fighting for hearth 
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and home. A strong chain of fortifications gave the corps as well as the 
populace, in each theme, a series of protected rallying points. 
The theme system was strong enough to repel minor incursions, and it 
almost invariably blunted and slowed even major invasions enough to give 
the strategic reserve time to reinforce or counterattack. This meant that for 
at least a half-millennium, the empire was relatively untroubled by the loss 
of key economic territory on the periphery, which had dogged the Roman 
Empire in its later years. To be sure, this problem eventually caught up with 
the Byzantine Empire as it decayed from within, but this did not occur until 
five centuries after its Roman sister-system in the West had coUapsed.7S 
Another key factor of the Byzantine system was its use of diplomacy. 
The threats that faced the Byzantine Empire became ever more coherent as 
the years went by. Eventually, she even faced another "superpower" in the 
rising empire of Islam. Constantinople was not above bribing an enemy, as 
an economy-of-force measure, while addressing a separate foe on another 
flank.76 Edward Gibbon castigates the Byzantines for this seemingly un­
manly conduct, but this was not a matter of appeasement for the sake of 
weakness; it was an expedient meant to retain the latitude to focus efforts 
where they were needed most.77 The Byzantines rarely allowed anyone, 
once bought, to renege on the arrangement.78 
The Byzantine navy, on the seaward flank, was also a key part of the 
system of forward defense. Using a combination of tactics and advanced 
technology such as Greek fire, the Byzantine fleet ensured the empire's 
superiority at sea.79 The Byzantine navy was originally a power-projection 
organization with sea «ontrol accruing gratuitously due to the absence of 
organized naval resistance. This changed with the rise of the fleets of the 
Vandals and later of Islam. At that point, the Byzantines applied the same 
professionalism to the problems of gaining and maintaining sea control that 
they showed in land warfare. 
Type of Reserve. The Byzantine mobile reserve was a superb cavalry 
organization famous for its horse archers. This mobile, hard-hitting force 
ensured the security of the imperial court against potential mutiny in the 
themes, but also carried out the function of a strategic reserve for the 
imperial periphery. It was a capable military organization devoted to the 
study of the art and science of war.80 Officers appear to have been rotated 
to service in different provincial themes often enough to ensure that they 
did not develop loyalties to regional leaders who could pose a threat to the 
emperor.81 
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The entire Byzantine anny reflected an approach toward the study of war 
unparalleled until the nineteenth century. Their military texts, such as Leo's 
Tactica andArs Militaira by Maurice, remain military classics to this day. 
The Byzantines were capable of thorough and accurate strategic estimates 
and operated a superb "lessons learned" system, as exemplified by this 
passage by Belisarius: "I found that the chief difference between the Goths 
and us was that our own Roman horse and Hunnishfoederati (mercenaries) 
are all expert horse bowmen .... Their bowmen on foot are always drawn 
up to the rear. So their horsemen are no good till the battle comes to close 
quarters, and can easily be shot down while standing in battle array before 
the moment of contact arrives. "82 
This studious approach to war permeates Byzantine history. The reserve 
appears to have been the hub of the professional education system, but it is 
also apparent that service with the provincial themes was a prerequisite for 
advancement.83 This would help mitigate the type of decline of the Byzan­
tine forward engagement system which would plague the late Roman 
system. 
Relative Closure Time of Reserve. The Byzantine ability to bring up its 
reserve to points on the imperial periphery was not technically greater than 
that of the late Roman model, although the Byzantine reserve appears to 
have been somewhat more mobile than the Roman, due to an improvement 
in logistics trains.84 It is hard to compare this system to the Roman model 
in this regard because the Byzantine Empire did not have a large body of 
water in its center as did the Romans. The Mediterranean Sea vastly 
complicated the Roman problem of maintaining communications and 
strategic transport. This made the Byzantine problem of mobility an easier 
one than that faced by Rome. In any case, the Byzantine model was far more 
able than the late Roman system to get its strategic reserve to the frontier, 
because the forward themes were able to buy the time necessary before vital 
territory and resources were lost. 
Economic Dependence on the Periphery. The Byzantine Empire was 
highly dependent on its periphery for manpower, food, and other resources; 
it could not afford to trade space for time.85 It was this knowledge that kept 
the forward-engagement component strong. The empire was fortunate here 
in that it was a mature security system. The dwellers on the imperial 
periphery valued their status as citizens of the empire and, for the most part, 
were willing to contribute to its defense.86 This made the management of 
the security system a corporate effort rather than a problem left only to the 
emperor, as it became in the West. The Eastern empire never fell prey to the 
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temptation to which Theodosius had surrendered in allowing federate status 
to the Gennan barbarians; that is, that he allowed the barbarians to be 
Romans when it was found useful to identify them as such. However, he 
had no means to compel their loyalty. Even though it made judicious use of 
mercenaries, the Eastern empire never became so dependent on them that 
they called the tune or controlled vital portions of the imperial marches. 
Thus. with a few notable exceptions. vital economic areas remained well 
protected for the five hundred years during which the system remained 
intact. 
Cost of the Security System. The system was probably comparable in cost 
to that of the middle Roman Empire. The standing army was undoubtedly 
expensive. as were the navy and the fortifications. This was mitigated by 
the extensive use of militia in the themes. The high quality and enthusiasm 
of these citizen soldiers were ensured by the many palpable threats that faced 
the empire. The militia knew they were defending their homes and family 
against a very real menace. Therefore, they were willing to put up with the 
rigors of periodic military training as a hedge against the disastrous alterna­
tive of invasion.87 Consequently, the cost of se(;urity was relatively high, 
but bearable. 
Indications and Warning. The Byzantine security system was one of the 
best in this respect that the world has ever seen. An organized series of spies, 
military observation, and diplomatic contacts kept a careful eye on enemies 
and friends alike.88 The impressive forward-based forces gave effective 
warning at the operational and tactical level to complement strategic intel­
ligence efforts. The Byzantine system of forward engagement made it less 
dependent on warning than was the late Roman system, but nevertheless the 
Eastern empire took every advantage of the earliest possible indications. 
Deterrence. The Byzantine Empire's leaders had a superb grasp of the 
political-military requirements for deterrence. They knew the value of 
power politics both domestically and in foreign affairs. They were not above 
terror, psychological operations, or bribery to gain vital national objectives. 
They understood long before Clausewitz that war is a political act, and they 
knew how to make themselves feared. The Byzantine's strategy after the 
reign of Justinian called for them never to start an unproductive war or let 
an enemy who had started one escape unscarred. 
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The British Empire from Waterloo to World War I As 
A Maritime Model 
Thus far the study bas not examined a system with truly global respon­
sibilities. The reason is simple: of the great security systems that have come 
and gone since the time of Columbus, only the British Empire after the fall 
of Napoleon meets the three given criteria as replicating the strategic 
conditions the United States will face in the post-Cold War world. This is 
particularly true with respect to the absence of a great superpower com­
petitor. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all faced great powers in their 
quest for worldwide empire; as often as not, that competitor was England. 
Even after 18 14, the British faced superpower competition in Europe. The 
British did not choose to play in that league; Britain instead chose to 
dominate the non-European world through unchallenged control of the seas. 
She was able to do so because of agreements reached at the Congress of 
Vienna, where Viscount Castlereagh agreed to accept Metternich's 
European balance of power. In return, Britain got access to French and 
Spanish overseas holdings that added immeasurably to its overseas empire. 
The Congress of Vienna thereby secured Britain's European flank. Al­
though the British eventually withdrew from the system by refusing to assist 
in the suppression of nationalist uprisings, they continued to benefit from 
the mechanisms created by the Congress of Vienna until Bismarck effec­
tively destroyed them in 187 1 .  However, the balance of power Bismarck 
then created acted as effectively in British interests as had the mechanisms 
of the Congress until Bismarck was dismissed in 1 890. At that point the 
European flank became much less secure.89 Until then, the British took 
advantage of their secure European flank to turn their string of colonies and 
naval bases into a security system unique in history. 
A combination of a small professional army having vast technological 
superiority over most potential foes with a clever use of indigenous soldiers 
in colonial formations allowed the British to maintain adequate security at 
a very affordable price. This advantage was reinforced by the fact that any 
possible combination of strategic foes would have to deal with the British 
fleet before posing a truly serious threat to the security of the system as a 
whole. This arrangement worked well for the British until they violated their 
own doctrine by engaging directly in a European war (World War I) that 






In addition, rapid technological change required the British to go to the 
great expense of modernizing her fleet to keep ahead of naval upstarts such 
as the Americans, Germans, and Japanese. Britain kept the naval lea� but 
only with difficulty. Even without World War I it is unlikely that the British 
would have kept the mantle of sole naval superpower for much longer; the 
winds of nationalism and navalism were blowing hard in nations with 
economic and industrial potential far greater than that of Great Britain. 
The British system lasted only a century, barely long enough to meet the 
hundred-year survival criteria laid down, but it merits consideration for two 
key reasons. First, as noted, it is the only truly global system to meet the 
criteria. Second, it is the only one that faced anything like the kind of 
technological change that our own new system will face in the coming 
decades. 
Method of Forward Engagement. As we do today, the British faced several 
regional challenges. In Europe, their problem was to keep the continental 
powers so preoccupied with each other that none would have the money or 
inclination to start a naval race or join coalitions to challenge British 
supremacy at sea. The result was that the British concept of forward 
engagement in this era was diplomacy, as a means of sustaining a balance 
of power. The mechanisms of the Congress of Vienna and Bismarck's 
system that replaced it were generally adequate to give the British a free 
hand elsewhere. The role of the Royal Navy in the system was to isolate 
British colonies and other possessions from outside interference. The con­
tribution of the British fleet and the evolution of gunboat diplomacy is well 
documented elsewhere; it is sufficient to say that its ubiquity and reputation 
for effectiveness played a major role in the relative state of global stability 
enjoyed throughout the nineteenth century. 90 
As befitted Britain's place among what Paul Kennedy calls "gunpowder 
empires," the British Anny maintained throughout the colonial possessions 
an effective- -forward presence, supported by its massive technological 
superiority over native threats and insulated by the navy from potential 
European foes.91 The colonial army was not particularly efficient by emerg­
ing European standards, but it became an extremely effective tool for the 
job at hand. It was greatly assisted in this by native regiments led by British 
officers, a cost-effective means to ensure colonial control. The Indian Anny, 
led by British officers, allowed a very small British cadre to control a 
teeming native popUlation very effectively. The same model on a smaller 
scale worked elsewhere in the empire as well.92 
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This happy situation lasted well past 1870 when the Prussians unified 
Gennany and altered the European balance enough to allow them to enter 
into a naval arms race if they so desired. Bismarck had the good sense to 
resist this temptation. His passing from the scene in 1 890 allowed Kaiser 
Wilhelm, however, to embark upon such a course. This was the beginning 
of the end of the Pax Britannica, and the result for Germany would ultimately 
be even more unhappy.93 
Type of Reserve. As with the early and mid-Roman systems, the British 
imperial model maintained no standing strategic reserve. None was re­
quired. Given the lack of coherent threats and also a population that 
mistrusted standing armies as a threat to civil government, the lack of such 
a reserve is hardly surprising. 
Relative Closure Time of Reserve. Again, as with the early and mid-Roman 
models, a reserve would have to be constituted before it was dispatched, 
making for a very unresponsive closure time. This defect was rendered 
relatively moot by the effective system of forward engagement and the 
protection afforded by the navy. To be sure, debacles occurred. The British 
military required 3 1 5  days to mount the failed rescue operation to Khartoum 
and a year and a half to react effectively to the Indian Mutiny. 94 As serious 
as these crises were at the time, they probably did not warrant the expense 
and political problems that would have resulted from the establishment of 
a reserve. Both situations were resolved quickly enough not to result in 
permanent damage to the empire. The ad hoc expedient of putting together 
expeditionary forces of warships, Royal Marines, and army units provided 
reaction time good enough for the general level of threat. In the century that 
the system effectively existed, it never lost a colony, and it expanded almost 
continuously until 1914.  
Economic Dependence on the Periphery. The string of colonies, trading 
bases, and dependencies that Britain maintained around the world was, quite 
literally, the imperial economy. The loss of India, Egypt, or South Africa 
would have destroyed the fabric of the interdependent imperial economic 
system.9S Britain was a truly great economic power because of the empire. 
That much of the empire was shed voluntarily, however commendably, does 
not erase the fact that its loss ended Britain's status as a true economic 
superpower. Even though the empire depended economically on the 
periphery, the oceans and the British fleet's control of them insulated the 
colonial system from European competitors and thereby gave the system 
good strategic depth. 
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Cost of Security System. This system was relatively inexpensive. Any 
security arrangement that relies on a great fleet-in-being will require vast 
sums of money , but the British fleet indispensably protected a maritime 
trade.96 The need to modernize after the onset of the ironclad made the 
system much more expensive in the last fifty years of its existence than in 
the first; overall, it was a relative bargain. 
The army also was extremely inexpensive until very close to World War 
I. Low pay rates for regulars and colonial troops alike, as well as the use of 
wtocratic officers willing to work for little financial compensation, al­
lowed the British to keep defense costs very low for most of the period. 97 
The British Army of the time was no match for a continental foe, nor was 
it meant to be.98 Britain's island status, its naval superiority, and the 
European balance system protected the homeland. The British Army was a 
colonial constabulary on a grand scale, and a cheap one at that. 
Indications and Warning. A security system with good strategic depth and 
adequate provision for forward engagement is not as dependent on early and 
accurate warning as one that lacks these advantages. The British were 
fortunate to possess both in abundance. They were doubly fortunate, because 
their resources for warning were mediocre at best. The British of the 
Victorian era were notoriously suspicious of people in intelligence work, 
and the perfonnance of Britain's intelligence services suffered according­
ly.99 Consequently, the British were surprised by the Indian Mutiny, the 
events in Khartoum, and the Boer Rebellion. Fortunately, none of these 
threats were of such a magnitude that they could not be handled by the very 
slow deployment of ad hoc response forces. 
Dete"ence. The deterrent posture of the empire was adequate to ensure the 
security of the system as a whole. The combined strength of the British fleet, 
the colonial anny, and active diplomacy created a synergistic effect of 
deterring revolts of dissatisfied native populations, warning off European 
overseas adventures that would hann British interests, and keeping 
Europeans preoccupied with continental events and therefore less interested 
in overseas projects than might otherwise have been the case. 
Gunboat diplomacy was a political-military innovation that allowed the 
rather ponderous British fleet to exercise a more precise forward function, 
particularly in what we now call "peacetime engagement." UlO Local poten­
tates who did not respect the reasonably light annament of the gunboats 
generally knew that it was backed up by far more fonnidable forces "over 
the horizon." 
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This deterrent effect of overall British power did not work in all cases. It 
was particularly weak when religious fanaticism was involved; the Indian 
Mutiny and the Dervish problem are examples. In other cases, such as the 
Boer War, British miscalculation undermined deterrence. lOt Overall how­
ever, the deterrent system served the empire well. 
A case can be made that the British Empire was the ftrSt world-class 
security system to be undone by technology. The development of ironclad 
warships and the maturation of German industry allowed the Kaiser's navy 
to challenge the British in a naval arms race that ultimately caused the British 
to adopt several policies that undermined the existing security system; given 
the Kaiser's ambitions, this was necessary. Britain could not be defended 
by "naval measures alone" from rising German military/naval power. loo 
Probably the most dangerous of these policies in the long run was to become 
so closely aligned with anti-German elements as virtually to ensure British 
continental participation in World War 1. 103 Closely tied to this was the 
reform of the British Army, which allowed the British to contemplate 
seriously full involvement in the coming conflict. This, combined with naval 
modernization, also made the security system much more expensive. In 
today's post-industrial age, the impact of technology on strategy will very 
likely become even greater than it was in the nineteenth century. 
Systemic Comparisons 
This section examines the strategy proposed in General Powell's  vision 
for dealing with the new world order in the 1990s and compares it to how 
our historical systems reacted to similar strategic problems and oppor­
tunities. This is done in the full realization of the dangers of historical 
parallelism or of a skewed attempt to draw lessons. The purpose here is to 
draw points of relevance and identify any obvious pitfalls that may await us 
in designing our own strategy. 
Figure 1 is a comparison of the proposed national strategy with the 
historical systems previously studied, using the same categories with which 
we examined the historical cases. The new strategy is designed to deal with 
a series of presently incoherent but very real security challenges that will 
arise over time. As in the Naval War College 199 1 Global War Game, the 
Chairman's strategy sees the world from a regional perspective, with each 
region presenting differing potential for crisis in a world of post-Soviet 
"devolution ... 104 Each of our five historical security systems also dealt with 
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regional challenges in the absence of a truly bipolar superpower competitor, 
but none of them faced a fonner competitor who, although much weakened, 
still retained the capability to destroy the remaining superpower as Russia 
will be able to do for some time to come. This factor may not become a 
day-to-day issue, but it will remain a major consideration in every major 
strategic decision. 
As the players in the 199 1  Global War Game found, predicting the world 
situation in the next ten to twenty years will be difficult, given the unprece­
dented breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. It appears certain 
that the new world order will be less orderly than the one we came to know 
from 1 945 to 1989. 105 This study has drawn heavily on the 1 99 1  Global War 
Game (GWG), less as a predictive model than as a medium for under­
standing the nature of the world that will face the new strategy as we attempt 
to implement it. The new world order, as nearly 1 ,200 players and analysts 
in Newport in the summer of 199 1  saw it, has several key features. 
• The game postulated the breakup of the Soviet Union into some­
thing smaller and much less manageable than the old Soviet state (being 
unaware, of course, of the future-and still inchoate-Commonwealth of 
Independent States) . 
• The players saw the United States as concerned primarily with 
three key regions: Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. They showed 
little interest in Africa, the Asian mainland, or even Latin America except 
insofar as those areas presented issues that threatened vital U.S. interests or 
world economic stability. 
• The Middle East was seen as continuing to be the most volatile 
region as well as the one in which effective U.S. forward presence was most 
problematical. It was also apparent that a deterrent would have to be very 
"visible" to be effective there. 
• Given an opportunity, the players representing the United States 
would have preferred to act through hegemonic regional coalitions to deal 
with security problems, but, due to lingering regional mistrust and tradition­
al hostilities, this did not prove feasible in the foreseeable future outside of 
Europe. The players tasked with designing U.S. strategy saw Nato continu­
ing to provide regional security and stability in Europe and hoped it would 
act as a model for the Pacific and the Middle East in the long run. They held 
out the prospect that the series of bilateral security relationships the U.S. 
has built in the Pacific would evolve into a Nato-like coalition, though 
presumably not within this century. They were much less hopeful about such 
a system evolving satisfactorily in the Middle East. 
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• In no region did the players see any viable substitute in the 
immediate future for the presence of the United States as a leader. I06 
If we overlay the new strategy upon this model of the new world order, 
two issues immediately arise. First, as the new strategy acknowledges, we 
will have some of the same regional responsibilities as in the former bipolar 
world, but we will have fewer assets with which to influence events. Second, 
our ability to keep U.S . forces forward deployed will diminish from Cold 
War levels as a result of both economics and a political-military environ­
ment wherein nations will be less willing to have U.S.  forces deployed on 
their soil than when there was an overarching Soviet threat. With this in 
mind, an examination of the new strategy within the construct of the 
historical case study systems is in order. 
Method of Forward Engagement. The new national military strategy 
envisions a method of forward engagement that "deters forward" but does 
not usually "defend forward" with U.S.  forces to the degree that was true in 
the past. I07 This is certainly in keeping with the perceived need to reduce 
the presence of U.S.  forces overseas. Figure 2 outlines the general compara­
tive sizes of forward-deployed forces proposed for the two regional theaters. 
Diplomacy and allied forward engagement, along with the strong and 
mobile reserve proposed in the contingency force, would make up for a 
reduction in forward presence under the plan as currently drafted. lOS The 
signed official strategy does not specify the relationship of the contingency 
force commander to any theater commander in chief that he is to support 
once his forces are deployed to the region. 
There is no obvious parallel with any of the historical cases, because a 
different system of forward engagement is currently envisioned for each 
region. In Europe, Nato will probably retain the capability to make the 
Chairman's vision work. In the Pacific, our bilateral defense agreements, 
combined with the strategic depth provided by the Pacific Ocean itself, 
should make the new strategy effective. Korea remains a special case here, 
but a strong U.S.  forward presence is still contemplated until Republic of 
Korea forces can become self-reliant enough to justify U.S. reductions. As 
this is one area where we can still expect to "defend forward," defensive 
battlefield success would be required to ensure the time necessary for the 
mobile reserve to play a decisive role. 
As a consequence, our new system of forward engagement is a series of 
mini-systems. In Europe, it most resembles the client-oriented early Roman 
model, with Nato acting as a client on a grand scale. Along the Pacific Rim 
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it resembles the Byzantine model; it relies strongly on indications and 
warning and strategic depth, as well as on the Seventh Fleet and other Pacific 
Command assets for forward presence. In the special case of Korea, there 
is an attempt at a balance that also closely resembles the Byzantine model . 
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In the Middle East however, we have a difficulty. Unlike on the Pacific 
Rim, there is no strategic depth. Worse still, our net of bilateral alliances is 
weaker there than in any other region. Neither is there much chance of 
creating the conditions for a strong forward defense even if we wanted to. 
At present (Autumn 1991)  we still have forces deployed in the region as a 
residue from Desert Storm, but this is a short-term deterrence measure, not 
part of a strategy of forward engagement. Unfortunately, the Global War 
Game found the Middle East to be the region where a clear deterrent will 
be most necessary, but also the area where it is most difficult to achieve. 100 
Type of Reserve. The new military strategy proposed by the Chairman 
would have a series of forward-engagement strategies that vary by region; 
this is not the case with the envisioned strategic reserve. The new strategy 
has a single strategic reserve (as outlined in Figure 3) to be employed in a 
crisis in any region (albeit in smaller tailored force packages if the situation 
warrants). This mobile strategic reserve is different in function from that of 
the late Roman and Byzantine models. The U.S .  contingency force is 
designed to realize economies in forces and money; it is primarily an attempt 
to do more with less. 
The late Roman and Byzantine reserve concept had a primary mission of 
preserving an autocratic, centralized, power base; their secondary mission 
was to guard the territorial integrity of their respective empires. The late 
Roman model attempted to use barbarian mercenary levies to provide 
perimeter security, with eventually disastrous results. 1 10 Its centralized 
reserve guarded the seat of power first, and counterattacked only after that 
mission was assured. I I I  The Byzantine system was more balanced; it relied 
on a combination of citizen militia and professional cadres to eliminate 
small incursions while delaying and disrupting large ones. The Byzantine 
emperors used mobile cavalry reserves as the decisive hammer to punish 
any invader seriously enough to cause him to consider carefully any further 
adventure. However, it is safe to assume that the rulers in Constantinople 
maintained this reserve under their own control in order to ensure that no 
ambitious local strategos (military governor or corps commander) turned 
his regional force into a threat to the imperial throne. 
The reserve created in the new U.S. strategy will face a different security 
system in each of the three major regions. If Nato continues to function 
reasonably well in cooperation with the political and economic framework 
of the European Community, and if the strategic depth afforded by the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact remains constant, the reserve should never 
have to be employed in Europe. With the exception of Korea, the same holds 
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true in the Pacific Rim, but for different reasons. Unchallenged U.S. naval 
supremacy and the vast distances involved will make it difficult for any 
potential foe to assemble a threat beyond the capability of U.S. forces. If 
U.S. forward presence in Korea remains viable, there should be an adequate 
element of forward engagement in case of North Korean invasion to give 
the strategic reserve time to arrive and counterattack (in a manner reminis­
cent of the Byzantine system). Accordingly, the mobile contingency reserve 
would enhance our systems of forward engagement in Europe and the 
Pacific Rim, as well as in the special case of Korea. The Middle East is 
another matter altogether. 
The new strategy does not have a standing force designed for the Middle 
East, and it contains no significant means of forward presence capable of 
either deterring aggression or buying time once aggression occurs. Also, the 
region offers virtually no strategic depth. This means that a mobile reserve 
will have to be extraordinarily fast-moving or have an indications and 
warning system bordering on the telepathic if the reserve plan is to be 
effective. Both of these subjects will be discussed in later sections, but 
suffice it to say that the effectiveness here of a strong mobile reserve as 
structured in General Powell's vision remains a point of concern. 
Relative Closure Time. The ability of the reserve to arrive in a crisis area 
relatively quickly has generally been a critical element in any security 
system dependent on a strong, mobile reserve. The tenn "relative" is key 
here. In the late Roman system, the reserve remained capable of great 
mobility, but its relative, or effective, mobility declined proportionately with 
the decline of effective forward presence. In the last years of the empire, the 
perimeter of the imperial security system was distressingly close to the 
center. This total lack of strategic depth rendered every loss of territory vital. 
Because there was no effective forward defense, any barbarian incursion 
was by definition initially successful, and every reaction by the reserve was 
a counterattack rather than a reinforcement. Ferrill points out that the 
resulting constant reaction and combat stress had a deleterious effect on the 
anny as a whole. The Byzantine system, by contrast, maintained a satisfac­
tory relative closure capability because of the healthy balance between 
forward engagement and the mobile reserve. Its original strategic depth was 
about the same as the late Roman model (because it had evolved from that 
system) . However, the Byzantines retained an effective and relatively 
inexpensive system of forward defense while the Romans neglected theirs. 
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CONTINGENCY FORCES 
The "come-as-you-are" arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises, requires fully 
trained, highly ready forces that are ra pidly deliverable, largely self-sufficient, and 
therefore drawn primarily from the active force structure. Our military strategy requires forces 
spedfically tailored to this challange. Each service brings unique capabilities to contingency 
forces. The Anny contributes airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable heavy 
forces. 'The Air Force brings its entire range of fighter and bomber forces. Carrier-based naval 
air power is an essential element as is the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, 
particularly when access ashore is contested. 'The unique capabilities of our Special Operations 
Forces are an essential resource which must be protected, even as we reduce our forces. 
I CONTINGENCY FORCES I 
o Forward Stationed and Deployed Anny. Navy, Marine and Air Forces-plus 
Special Operations Forces 
o Joint National Contingency Forces 
-Can Provide Principal Response or Complement Forward Deployed Forces 
-OPCON to Geographic CINC 
-Faciliates Joint Training and the Development of Joint Doctrine and Tactics 
o Respond to the Unexpected and Unpredictable 
-Mobile, Flexible, Fast, and Lethal 
CINCS ASSIGNED FORCES 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
JOINT NATIONAL CONTINGENCY FORCES 
� � USMC 
4-5 Div Tailored Mix MEF 
These forces will include: 
llSAE 
7 TFW  
• Forward stationed and deployed Anny, Navy, Marine, and Air Forces and 
prepositioned equipment and supplies. 
• Special Operations Force units drawn from the Anny, Navy, and Air Force. 
• Joint National Contingency Forces: Our global interests dictate the need to 
preserve and enhance a core of mobile, flexible, highly trained, and ready forces, based in 
the CONUS, that can deploy-and arrive ready to fight-on short notice in response to 
unpredictable future crises. They complement our forward deployed assets; can provide an 
initial response capability where we have no forward deployed forces; can be an additive 
force where we do; facilitate joint training and the development of joint doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures; and enhance joint force employmnet since these forces will 
routinely train together. 
Figure 3.  
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy [draft] (Washington: U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 30 September 1991). 
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The key point here is that the new national military strategy has potential 
problems in the Middle East. 1 12 The previously discussed lack of forward 
engagement and strategic depth in the Persian Gulf area gives even our most 
agile reserve elements poor relative mobility in the strategy as it is currently 
articulated. With the exception of forward deployed amphibious forces and 
the MPF, the United States will be unable to bring credible and sustainable 
ground forces into the region within thirty days of the order to deploy. This 
would be true even under the most optimistic projections for procurement 
of fast sea lift and the C- 17 aircraft. 1 l 3 In other regions, with combinations 
of effective forward engagement, strategic depth, and sea control, this 
closure capability is acceptable; in the Middle East it is not. 
Economic Dependence on Periphery. This concept actually detennines 
strategic depth, because it dictates how much space the system can afford 
to trade for time. A security system may make this tradeoff if it is not 
dependent on the periphery for vital raw materials or food. If that dependence 
exists, the system must develop some means of ensuring the integrity of 
the periphery-by forward engagement, rapid response to threats, or some 
combination thereof. The global system of economic interdependencies that 
the new U.S.  strategy will be called upon to defend is a necklace of 
industrialized nations and resource providers with several vital nodes such 
as the Pacific Rim, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States itself. 
Several of these regions have strategic depth in relation to potential threats; 
as outlined earlier, the Pacific Ocean gives the Pacific Rim considerable 
depth. "Depth" today is not so much a matter of distance as of water barriers; 
few states are able to mount a naval expedition large enough to threaten 
seriously island nations such as Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia-at least not 
without a naval construction program which would undoubtedly give suffi­
cient warning to the United States and other actors in the region. This depth 
does not exist in Korea, but we can expect to see a viable enough forward 
defense there to make the new strategy effective. 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union gives Europe a 
reasonable degree of breathing room; this will allow latitude for designing 
reduced, but effective, forward presence arrangements. Again we see 
problems in the Middle East. The vital Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields are a 
mere few hours' march from the nearest nations capable of threatening them. 
Lacking a viable forward presence, our alternative is a mobile reserve with 
a relatively short closure time. As discussed earlier, we lack this also. 
In this connection we find a strong cautionary lesson in the unhappy fate 
of the late Roman system. In the early empire, Rome had not yet come to 
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depend on the regions that were to become vital economic provinces during 
the middle imperial period. As a consequence, the early imperium could 
buy cheap defense-in-depth by means of the client system. The Roman 
Empire of the middle era protected the now-vital regions through preclusive 
security in the form of strong forward basing. These regions were no less 
vital to the late empire, but the forward engagement strategy was replaced 
by a mobile reserve that was simply not fast enough to defend against a 
threat or strong enough to retake regions once lost. Thus, each loss became 
cumulative. 
If, however, the fate of the late Roman system should serve as a warning 
of the dangers associated with the lack of an adequate forward-engagement 
strategy, it should not lead us to the hasty conclusion that a standing strategic 
reserve will not work. It does indicate that a lack of strong forward engage­
ment is dangerous in the absence of strategic depth between the periphery 
and vital economic areas. 
Cost of the Security System. The relative cost of the new U.S. security 
system as opposed to the historical cases examined in this study is of great 
interest here. The primary rationale for the new U. S. concept is its reduction 
in manpower and operating costs from the levels associated with the Cold 
War. 
There is excellent evidence to suggest that, with the exception of the late 
Roman model, each of the historical security systems examined in this study 
existed because their creators were willing, in view of the threat that existed 
at the time, to accept the costs associated with them. The early Roman 
system, true to its frugal Latin origin, demanded that its clients pay a 
proportionate share. In effect, the Romans "bought" strategic depth by 
ceding much control to clients within their respective spheres of influence 
in exchange for Roman assistance when truly serious threats surfaced. This 
saved Rome much in the way of manpower and treasure; it was truly security 
on the cheap. The middle imperial period of preclusive security saw Rome 
exclusively assuming the cost of imperial security� in doing so, of course, 
she gained the advantage of exclusive control over the entire security system 
including that which had formerly been in the purview of the client kings. 1 14 
The middle imperium was more expensive than the early period, but not 
nearly as expensive as the late system, which ultimately proved to be as 
inefficient as it was ineffective. Although Edward Luttwak dwells on its 
early successes, Arther Ferrill reminds us that the system eventually proved 
a costly failure. 1 15 
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For a militarized autocracy, the Byzantine Empire proved to be a relative 
bargain from the perspective of security. The use of a healthy citizen militia 
backed up by a solid professional cadre proved to be an effective and 
reasonably efficient means of forward engagement. To be sure, the system 
was more expensive than the early or middle Roman models, because it 
added a strong centralized reserve (which was designed probably to protect 
the central government as much as the marches). However, the cost was 
made acceptable by the relative coherence of the threat compared to that 
facing the other four models; peasants and emperors alike could see the 
danger from every direction. 
Napoleon was to refer contemptuously to the British as a "nation of 
shopkeepers," but the shopkeepers were to lock him away and build a 
security system that would dominate the world beyond Europe for the 
century. In World War I they were then forced by circumstances largely 
beyond their control to violate their prime economic directive by becoming 
decisively involved in a major European war. 
It appears that the new u.s. strategy can succeed in giving acceptable 
security at a reasonable cost in manpower and national treasure in Europe, 
the Pacific rim, and in Korea. Even in the problematic Middle East, the 
solutions to problems of improving deterrence and decreasing our closure 
time to the theater appear to be matters of allocation of existing resources 
rather than of need for increased resources. The proof will be in the 
implementation. 
Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. As we have seen, a 
balance between these elements is not a prerequisite for a successful security 
system. In three of our five cases there was no strategic reserve at all, with 
no catastrophic result. These three systems survived by use of strategic 
depth, strong forward engagement, or a combination of both. Only the 
Byzantine system had an effective balance. The Byzantine Empire was 
dependent on the periphery for its economic survival as a great power; it 
developed a balance because it lacked the strategic depth to allow a defense 
that could trade space for time. The periphery required strong forward 
engagement, and the emperors demanded protection for their seat of power. 
Given strong forward engagement or great strategic depth, a security 
system can probably do nicely without a strong standing reserve, as did the 
first two Roman systems and British imperial model. Unfortunately, we lack 
today the depth and forward-engagement potential afforded by previous 
systems in the key area of the Middle East. This problem of strategic balance 
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will be the greatest security challenge facing the implementation of the new 
strategy. 
Indications and Warning. Intelligence and warning have played a role in 
all of our historical case studies, but the centrality of that role has depended 
on the success of the forward engagement strategy and the strategic depth 
involved. The early imperial Romans, middle-empire Romans, and Byzan­
tines appear to have had excellent intelligence systems, inasmuch as their 
warning was proportionate to the time needed to react. The British system 
was less impressive, but the diffuseness of the threat, combined with the 
absolute British ability to isolate a problem area through sea supremacy, 
negated the need for a truly efficient warning system. A mediocre system 
of I&W was good enough in the greater scheme of things. 
The late Roman Empire saw its intelligence system decline fastest at the 
very time it was needed most. It appears that the late Rome security system 
as it existed around the early third century, when Luttwak contends that it 
did a good job, was complemented by a competent warning system. This 
was also the period when some balance remained between forward presence 
and the mobile reserve. However, as in most security systems, the real 
effectiveness of "indications and warning" is rooted in the system of forward 
presence. As Roman control on the periphery became more and more 
dependent on barbarian mercenaries, so did its intelligence sources. Rome 
knew what the barbarians in her service let her know, and this benefited 
Rome only insofar as Roman and barbarian agendas coincided. 
Since the late 1970s the U.S .  indications and warning system has been 
very dependent on technological means, whereas historically it has been 
based on human intelligence. 1 16 As seen in the events leading up to Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, space-based imagery and other technical means 
can only indicate what the enemy allows us to see and hear or that which 
cannot be hidden. It does not tell us about hidden agendas or other factors 
so important when we have neither sufficient forces to slow or stop an enemy 
nor sufficient strategic depth to trade space for time. The good news here is 
for Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Korea, where our new strategy will 
probably offer sufficient forward engagement or strategic depth to make our 
indications and warning system adequate. As in most categories, the Middle 
East remains a difficult case. If the 199 1  Global War Game is at all 
predictive, we will need at least sixty days of warning to deploy adequately 
the strategic mobile reserve presently contemplated. In fact, we simply will 
not have that much advance notice to get our troops in place, and we will 
lack prepositioned forces to buy time to do so. 
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Deterrence. All security systems worthy of the name incorporate some form 
of deterrence. The early Roman system, as Luttwak describes it, deterred 
its more sophisticated foes through the certainty of Roman power "over the 
horizon"; less subtle potential adversaries were given more frequent and 
blunter lessons in the efficacy of Roman anns. 1 I7  The preclusive security 
system of the middle Empire had a more universally visible manifestation 
in its system of field fortifications. Likewise the Byzantines were extremely 
conspicuous in their security precautions and were careful in the psychologi­
cal messages of military preparedness they sent to a plethora of potential 
foes. Even when the Byzantines were forced to pay bribes, they took great 
pains to let the recipient know that he was to stay bribed or suffer the 
consequences. The British in their time maintained a very marked presence 
in their colonies to deter bad behavior by colonists and natives alike. The 
British navy effectively kept troublesome third powers out of their sphere 
of influence. The later years of the late Roman epoch, on the other hand, 
were difficult for the imperium in that although the Roman army remained 
an effective field force, it had lost the reputation of invincibility it had 
enjoyed as late as the third century. Potential adversaries respected it but 
were no longer terrified of it. Delbruck and Ferrill disagree on the cause of 
this situation, but both agree that the eventual impact on Roman deterrence 
was disastrous. 
If, again, the results of the 1 99 1 Global War Game can be relied upon, it 
is ironic that the deterrent effect of the U. S .  victory in Operation Desert 
Storm will probably be greater everywhere except where it was exercised 
and where it will probably remain most needed: the Middle East itself. The 
postwar experience of Iraqi rearmament supports the 199 1 Global War 
Game's conclusion that actors in this region must face deterrent presence 
that is active and exercised often if they are in fact to be deterred. Unfor­
tunately this is the very region where such a presence is most difficult to 
achieve. 
The U.S. strategy for the 1990s appears viable as currently articulated in 
every key region in the security system of the new world order except in the 
Middle East, where it is most likely to be challenged. We do not need to 
scrap the new concept; the proposed strategy has a very strong basis in fiscal 
reality, postulating a method that we can afford. Unlike the historical models 
examined, the approach of the new strategy will require a different method 
of forward presence in each region where vital U.S .  security interests exist. 
The Middle East, however, will call for an effective forward presence where 
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the United States has traditionally not maintained one; this is a challenge, 
but not an impossible one. 
I
n the best of all possible worlds, the ideal solution to the u.s.  strategic 
dilemma of trying both to lead a great global security system and to seek 
stability in an increasingly unstable world, at an affordable price, would be 
to pursue the option originally attempted by the players representing the 
United States in the 199 1  Naval War College Global War Game. The players 
wanted to create standing regional coalitions designed, in effect, to be the 
rough equivalent of the clients in the early Roman hegemonic model. The 
players sought coalitions where the U. S. could be a senior partner, not an 
imperator in the Roman sense. In this they anticipated President Bush in his 
remarks to the United Nations in September 199 1 .  As far as possible, the 
players representing U.S .  decision makers wanted to craft coalitions to 
handle local instabilities by creating standing regional mechanisms with the 
support when necessary of U.S. military power. They hoped for such 
coalitions in Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East, and also for a stronger 
U.N. role . 
Implementing this vision in the game proved to be difficult. The players 
found that, with the exception of Nato in Europe, most regions were not 
ready for this kind of security arrangement in the near term. Regional 
antagonisms died hard, and there was a lingering mistrust of certain actors 
in the Midd le East and the Pacific-key actors which were indispensable to 
viable coalitions. While agreeing that stabilizing coalitions are a worthy 
long-term goal, the players quickly came to the realization that there must 
be interim mechanisms, and that the interim may last a very long time. 1 18 
The game also indicated that there is no short-run substitute for U. S .  
forward presence in any region, including Europe. The players generally 
agreed that the United States could cut back significantly in Nato and that 
some decrease in presence in the Pacific was warranted; however, no total 
substitute for U. S .  involvement could be found in any region. The U. S . role 
in Europe was seen as evolving from that of military leader to one of honest 
broker. The security structure in the Pacific is now built around a web of 
bilateral agreements between the U. S .  and other Pacific powers, agreements 
which could well become the basis for ad hoc coalitions in case of regional 
crises; however, the region did not appear ready for standing mechanisms. 
The Middle East was even more intractable in this regard. There, the U.S.  
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is linked bilaterally with several states which do not even talk with each 
other. There was simply no substitute for U.S.  engagement. 1 19 
Given the imperfect world we live in, the strategy outlined by the 
Chainnan, and as recently issued in "The National Military Strategy for the 
1 990s," is a logical approach to the problem of managing worldwide 
stability without bankrupting ourselves as a nation. It will work in Europe 
where the combination of Nato and our new-found strategic depth should 
serve us well .  Likewise, in the Pacific we have adequate strategic depth and 
the sea superiority afforded by the Seventh Fleet to provide adequate 
forward engagement to back up our string of bilateral security agreements. 
Even in the special case of Korea we maintain adequate forward engagement 
to buy time in which to bring U.S. forces to bear should deterrence fail. 
Only in the Middle East does the proposed U. S .  strategy face a situation 
where we lack the strategic depth, adequate forward deployed forces, and 
indications and warning to give us relative closure capability adequate to 
ensure either deterrence or sufficiently rapid response against a regional 
aggressor, such as Iran or Iraq. There are two alternatives. The first is to 
seek an entirely new strategy which will adequately cover all regions. The 
second is to adjust the proposed strategy to make it viable in the Middle 
East. The first alternative is probably not realistic; the Chainnan's vision is 
a commonsense one. It does have definite problems in one critical region, 
but this writer believes we can adjust the new strategy to compensate for its 
shortcomings in the Middle East without sacrificing the excellent overall 
concept. If we accept that the strategy can be fine-tuned in the Middle East, 
we are then led to the question of how to do so. 
Options for Improvement. There are three ways in which the shortcomings 
of the current strategic vision might be adjusted in the Middle East region: 
first, by building a better system of forward presence; second, by improving 
the relative closure time of the strategic reserve; and third, by improving 
our indications and warning to make the thirty-day window of vulnerability 
we currently face less crippling. The Global War Game saw as critical the 
effective ability to react with credible and sustainable forces within thirty 
days of the start of a crisis. It showed a need to improve response capability 
in this time frame. Improving 1& W is a difficult option because it is effective 
only in proportion to the readiness of decision makers to accept and act on 
it quickly and decisively-a matter outside the realm of strategy and not a 
strategic option. Consequently, the options presented below for adjusting 
the current strategic vision in the Middle East aim at improving forward 
presence and improving our relative closure time. 
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Option One. Pennanent basing (to improve forward engagement) is a 
preclusive security arrangement that would allow us to keep ground and air 
forces pennanently based in the Middle East and prepositioned ground 
equipment (pomcus) in Europe. This would probably involve a combination 
of ground prepositioning and rotational unit deployment that would reduce 
reaction time while giving us a credible deterrent. It would also reduce our 
dependence on timely warning. 
Option Two. A more rapid mobile reserve (for improved relative closure 
capability) would reduce the closure time of the contingency force through 
buying increasingly fast sea lift and more and larger transport aircraft. The 
decreased reaction time would lower our profile in the region day-to-day 
while increasing our strategic mobility in all regions, not just the Middle 
East. 
Option Three. A hegemonic client-oriented strategy (for improved for­
ward engagement) suggests that lacking a client coalition in the short run, 
the United States could opt to cultivate a regional hegemonic state as the 
primary means of our own forward engagement, in a manner reminiscent 
of the early Roman imperial model. This solution would have to allow for 
greater relative deterrence, but it could permit longer closure times if the 
client 's  anned forces remain competitive with any likely opponent. This is 
the approach we attempted with Iran from the fifties to the late seventies. 
In that case we picked a poor client, but that does not mean that the concept 
is inherently flawed. We should learn from the Iranian experience that client 
relationships are high-risk affairs, subject to vagaries of the client 's internal 
politics. A reliable client would also compensate for less than ideal warning, 
because the critical warning time from a U.S.  standpoint would be that 
necessary for a potential adversary to build a force that would require our 
assistance to the client. 
Option Four. A "naval bridge" strategy (a combination of improved 
forward presence and relative closure capability) would be the use of 
combined carrier task forces, maritime prepositioning forces, and forward­
deployed amphibious forces acting both as means of forward engagement 
and as a connecting "bridge" between the forward engagement component 
and the strategic contingency force outlined in the Chainnan's vision. Such 
a strategy would entail the movement of the Maritime Prepositioning 
Squadron One, currently assigned to Europe, closer to the Middle East in 
order to reduce its transit time; this would also mean more penneable 
boundaries between unified commands. It would also entail more frequent 
visits and exercises of the maritime prepositioning squadrons to the Gulf for 
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such demonstrations as off-loading exercises. This strategy would also 
require an aircraft carrier and an amphibious ready group close to the Straits 
of Hormuz on a pennanent basis. It would give the United States the ability 
to bring up the equivalent of a mid-sized Marine Expeditionary Force 
(37,000 personnel) well under the thirty days after crisis recognition that we 
previously mentioned as critical for effective crisis response; more impor­
tantly, this force would arrive with thirty days of logistical endurance. 1 20 
The purpose of this force would be to provide the bridge between forward 
presence and the contingency role. This bridge would provide visible, 
credible deterrence as well as an effective and logistically sustainable 
forward-deployed presence should deterrence fail .  This ability to bridge the 
gap between the thirty-day window of vulnerability and the sixty days 
required to get the bulk of the standing strategic "contingency force" into 
the theater was seen as critical by the GWG 9 1  players. 
Discussion of Options. Option one (pennanent basing) would be very 
difficult to implement, barring extraordinary and unforseen developments. 
Ground basing is not a desirable component in the Middle East region. Most 
governments in the region view a large, long-term U.S. presence as a 
potentially greater threat to their internal security than any potential external 
power. The combination of anti-Western hostility among Muslims (espe­
cially Shiites) and the fear of "contamination" by Western influences is 
probably very realistic. It is also likely that Congress and the American 
public would balk at the cost of any new overseas basing in an era when 
some sort of peace dividend is expected. This would be a very difficult 
option to sell in the absence of any strong lobbying effort for an increased 
U.S. ground presence by Mideast states. 
Option two (a more rapid mobile reserve) will probably come about to 
some degree as a natural outgrowth of the Chainnan's vision, but the 
improvement in strategic mobility will probably be evolutionary and de­
pendent on cost constraints. It will not be a quick fix, and it will not make 
up for the lack of strategic depth and effective forward defense that dogged 
us during the Iraqi crisis in 1 990. In addition, it would not lead to a truly 
credible deterrent in a region where leaders most need to observe power to 
appreciate it. This option would be the most expensive of the four if we 
attempted to increase strategic mobility enough to bring sufficient anny 
forces to the region within the critical first thirty days of a crisis. The players 
in the 1 99 1  Global War Game saw that as improbable, given current 
budgetary realities. They saw the reduction of the closure time from sixty 
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to something approaching thirty days as a more realistic, but still a very 
expensive, alternative. 
Option three (a hegemonic client-oriented strategy) is also probably not 
viable at present given the current governments of the likely candidate 
clients, but the evolution to such a system should not be ruled out as an 
eventual possibility. Since the two most likely client candidates (Iraq and 
Iran) are currently very hostile to U. S .  interests, luring one into our camp 
would be a long process, and getting the American public to accept such a 
relationship would be problematic at best. The possibility of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council developing into a militarily effective Nato-like entity 
cannot be ruled out in the long run, but the Global War Game players did 
not see it as a realistic near-term option. An eventual evolution to this 
strategy would not necessarily be precluded by the interim adoption of one 
or more of the other options. 
Option four (a naval bridge strategy) has the attraction of not requiring 
new forces and of being readily achievable within the guidelines of General 
Powell 's vision. It would also assist the rapid introduction and initial 
sustainment of contingency forces into theater when necessary. Perhaps the 
best argument in favor of such a strategy is that it can be implemented with 
forces and equipment currently in the inventory at very little cost increase 
over existing arrangements. Additionally, the Maritime Prepositioned Force 
(MPF) combined with other prepositioned assets (such as those currently 
maintained by the U.S.  Army and Air Force) would logistically sustain army 
and air force elements as they arrive in theater; the precedent for this was 
set during the initial phases of Desert Shield. This ability to act as an 
"enabling force" truly makes the Navy-Marine Corps team the bridge 
between forward presence and the introduction of strategic reserves. Anny 
and air force initiatives to improve strategic mobility would be complemen­
tary to the concept rather than competitive with it. The relatively small 
"footprint" of a MPF squadron, with its 150 or so merchant seamen and a 
tiny complement of full-time navy personnel, would almost certainly be 
easier to "sell," from a political-military standpoint, to Bahrain, Oman, 
Qatar, or other potential exercise hosts. 
This proposed course of action will be greatly enhanced if the navy 
continues to examine options for changing the mix of aircraft in carrier air 
wings to provide a greater air-to-ground capability; this orientation would 
have utility in the Middle East, where the sophisticated anti-ship threat once 
posed by the Soviet Union has dissipated. This is not to suggest that the navy 
abandon its sea-control mission, a prerequisite for power projection, but it 
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does reflect the reality that sea control can now be presumed, except at choke 
points and close inshore (the areas where the line between sea control and 
power projection becomes somewhat blurred). The allegation by some 
analysts that the navy did not bring to bear enough "air-to-mud" capability 
during Desert Stonn and will not do so in the future would be largely 
overcome by creating forces tailored to local enemy denial capabilities 
rather than by deploying standard packages to all regions of the world. At 
this writing the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting a "Naval Force 
Capabilities Planning Effort" designed to seek more flexible and innovative 
methods of employing naval power in the manner described above. 
The principal disadvantage of this "naval bridge option" is that it will 
require frequent and vigorous exercises to remind regional actors-several 
of which are notoriously slow leamers-of its capabilities and rapid respon­
siveness. U. S. planners need to keep in mind that one of the primary causes 
of the 1 990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a fundamental misunderstanding 
of both the will and the capability of the United States to act decisively in 
the Middle East region. The naval bridge option will require less dependence 
on timely indications and warning than option two, but it will be more 
dependent on it than options one and three. Option four has a third disad­
vantage in that it will  require some hard strategic decisions. Most of all ,  the 
pennanent placement of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready 
group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit on station in the region may well 
require a smaller reduction in naval forces than is currently contemplated, 
or the acceptance of some degree of risk elsewhere by reducing presence 
there. The dedication of a second MPF squadron to the Middle East, moving 
it closer to that theater, entails less risk if the Atlantic squadron is chosen. 
The threat in Europe appears to have diminished radically in the wake of 
the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. This certainly does 
not mean that MPF might not be used in Europe, but merely that the strategic 
calculus has changed to the extent that "hot spots," such as the Middle East 
and Korea, will require more immediate response in the foreseeable future 
than will Europe. 
Conclusions. Option four, the naval bridge, appears to be potentially the 
most realistic of the options in the near tenn. Option two is less expensive 
than the others, but due to fiscal realities, is much less achievable in the near 
tenn, if at all. Option three will probably be considered as an ultimate 
solution to the imbalance between forward deployment and strategic con­
tingency forces if relations with any of the potential candidate hegemonic 
clients improves in the long tenn. TIlis option will have to overcome strong 
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memories of the debacle of our attempt to cultivate Iran; it is a very high-risk 
option. Option one would be difficult due to the cost, regional dislike of a 
standing Western presence, and the vulnerability of land prepositioning 
without adequate forces readily available for protection in the early stages 
of a crisis. Option one offers the best chance of deterring aggression in the 
region and of acting effectively early if deterrence fails. Option four offers 
the best opportunity for early forcible reentry into the region if an attacker 
strikes the arrival ports and airfields with nuclear or chemical weapons; the 
MPF carrier battle group and amphibious ready group would provide the 
core of the forward air and logistics needed. Of course the MPF would need 
to off-load and transfer some equipment to amphibious shipping in order to 
support adequately an amphibious operation; marines have been preparing 
for such an eventuality for years. 
Would a forward engagement system of the size proposed in option four 
be enough to deter or fight effectively if deterrence failed? Michael Mazarr 
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the United 
States needs a middle-weight mechanized corps. He states that if we had 
possessed such a corps (a light armored division and a light mechanized or 
motorized division supported by an armored cavalry regiment and an 
airmobile brigade) on 2 August 1990, we could have more effectively 
deterred Iraq. He further believes that such a force, designed to be flown 
into Saudi Arabia within a week or so, could have combined with the Saudi 
army and expanding U.S .  tactical air assets (on land or at sea) to put up a 
very stiff fight. III 
If the Global War Game and the results of Desert Shield are at all 
predictive, the corps Mazarr postulates is not logistically feasible using 
purely army assets likely to be available in the near term. However, such an 
organization becomes much more realistic when built around the Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) postulated in option four, with its thirty days 
of sustainability. The ground combat element of that MEF is a marine 
mechanized division with a corps-sized command element already in place; 
its organization takes advantage of the synergism of the marine Air-Ground 
Task Force concept as well as its logistics sustainability. When army 
logistics units arrived in theater, the force could be reconfigured along 
service lines as appropriate. This is an example of the credibility and 
sustainability the naval bridge strategy affords, in which each service lends 
its own unique strengths to the overall efforts. 
Recommendation. The naval bridge concept of option four should be 
adopted immediately, as it makes the strategy outlined in the Chairman's 
4 1  
vision viable, using assets currently existing, without major changes in force 
structure and with minimal political-military repercussions for the Middle 
East. The other options should be pursued as longer tenn solutions to the 
overall strategic problem in the Gulf Region as the situation dictates. 
Improving strategic mobility as outlined in option two should remain a high 
national strategic priority. The client-oriented strategy outlined in op­
tion three would best be pursued in the fonn of a Nato-like client coalition. 
This will be a very long-tenn endeavor if it can be done at all in the Middle 
East, where mistrust and long-standing rivalries are a virtual cottage in­
dustry. Opportunities to improve forward presence should be pursued as 
they adse, but we need to be aware that this option may well prove a 
double-edged sword in tenns of internal instability within allied nations. It 
should be noted that since the original draft of this monograph in August 
199 1 ,  several of the elements of the naval bridge option have been imple­
mented, and the rest are contemplated. 
In his lecture on Metternich and the Congress of Vienna, Professor 
George Baer of the Naval War College points out that the systems created 
by Metternich and Bismarck shared a major weakness in that both stressed 
stability over the creative management of change. The word "stability" is 
often used interchangeably with the concept of the "new world order" in 
discussing the present changing national security environment. The naval 
bridge strategy proposed in this paper is seen as a short to mid-tenn "fix" 
to a recognized soft spot in the proposed national military strategy. How­
ever, even this concept should probably be viewed as itself a bridge to an 
ultimate system of standing regional coalitions designed to manage change, 
allow for healthy commerce and economic development, and guard against 
elements that would seek change through catastrophic means. The new 
world order is a blank slate with enonnous potential for good as well as evil, 
and the potential for evil must remain a major consideration in our national 
security planning. The National Military Strategy provides a superb vehicle 
for feeling our way into a new era, but it should be viewed as an evolving 
entity rather than as a closed system. 
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